Additive particles or adverbs like too or again are sometimes obligatory. This does not follow from the meaning commonly ascribed to them. I argue that the text without the additive is incoherent because the context contradicts a contrast implicature stemming from the additive's associate, and that the text with the additive is coherent because the presupposed alternative is added to the associate, so that the implicature does not concern that alternative. I show that this analysis is better than the account offered by Krifka (1999) and that, contra Zeevat (2003) , the notion of a presupposition is essential.
INTRODUCTION
It has been noted several times (e.g. by Green 1973; Kaplan 1984; Krifka 1999 ) that additive particles and adverbs like too and again can be necessary in the sense that the discourse becomes incoherent if they are omitted. This necessity does not follow from any current analysis of these words. Standardly (cf. e.g. Fabricius-Hansen 1983; König 1991; Beaver 1997) , they are described as pure presupposition triggers, and the contexts where they are necessary are contexts where the presuppositions are verified. Thus prima facie, they should be redundant precisely when instead, they seem to fulfil some important function, as in (1) or (2).
Brundtland had been environment minister of Norway, and from that post she had gone on to become prime minister. She likes to claim that she is the only politician ever to rise from the traditionally thankless and dead-end job of the environment portfolio to lead a nation, and that this gives her an insight most political leaders lack. Even more important, for the purposes of the new commission, she had lost the prime minister's job, and had time to devote to the commission.
In 1986, in the middle of the commission's work, she became prime minister #(again), which forced greater respect from other countries for her and her commission as they travelled the globe studying the situation. Krifka (1999) proposes to modify the standard analysis of too slightly so as to account for its necessity in cases like (3): In addition to its presupposition, the particle explicates an affirmative element, facilitating the violation of an implicature (the 'distinctiveness constraint') from the sentence verifying the presupposition.
(3) -What do Peter and Paul sing?
-Peter sings tenor, and Paul sings tenor #(too).
In the first part of the answer in (3), as Krifka's story goes, Peterthe presupposed alternative-is a contrastive topic, giving rise to the implicature that (as far as the speaker is aware) only Peter sings tenor; this, however, is contradicted (cancelled) in the second part, saying that Paul-the associate-sings tenor as well. This diagnosis of the version without the additive rests on the assumption that the alternative is a contrastive topic in a sentence equivalent to the additive sentence modulo the substitution of the associate. This, however, is far from always the case. On the other hand, the associate is consistently a contrastive topic, and I will argue that in the absence of the additive, it gives rise to an implicature contradicted by any context verifying the presupposition of the additive. I will propose that the additive remedies this incoherence by causing the presupposed alternative to be added to the associate, so that the implicature does not concern that alternative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I define the problem and assess the account proposed by Krifka (1999) . In 1 Krifka only considers that version without too where the VP inherits the accent from too. This version may be incoherent for the simple reason that second mention material cannot carry an accent. The issue of accentuation will be addressed in Section 3. Also, the conjunction and in Krifka's examples complicates the picture; if it has an accent, the version without too is better. To be on the safe side, one has to look at authentic cases without conjunctions, like (1) and (2). Section 3, I use elements of that account to develop my own account of why the additives are necessary, and in Section 4, I supplement an account of why they are sufficient.
THE PROBLEM: WHY ADDITIVES ARE NECESSARY
In this section, I will determine the conditions under which an additive is necessary. I will also investigate one answer to the question what makes the additive necessary, the one given by Krifka (1999) , and demonstrate that it depends on a too narrow notion of the conditions under which the necessity obtains.
Some basic terms and tools should be introduced right away.
Association and presupposition
I use the noun additive as a cover term for additive particles, like too, and for additive adverbs, like again; these two words represent sets of items, in one language (including, e.g. also and as well in English) and across languages. The additive introduces a presupposition: The sentence the additive occurs in with some alternative substituted for the constituent the additive associates with; i.e. some prior time or event (for again) or some alternative of any type (for too). For the presupposition to be verified, such a sentence must follow from the context. The alternative in the context will be referred to as the presupposed alternative, and the constituent the additive associates with will simply be called the associate.
Mostly, the associate is a constituent containing the one accent in the sentence beside the one on the additive. Additive particles have been called focus particles because they have been associated with focus (e.g. König 1991; Rooth 1985 Rooth , 1992 . Once one distinguishes between focus (comment focus, rheme focus) and topic (topic focus, theme focus), one may ask which one applies to the associate. Krifka (1999) assumes that it is the latter:
Contrastive topic hypothesis
The associated constituent of stressed postposed additive particles is the contrastive topic of the clause in which they occur. (Krifka 1999) But what is a contrastive topic? First, it is an accented topic, a sentence topic in a tripartition of sentences assumed, inter alia, by Büring (1999) , a topic or theme focus in a two-level bipartition of sentences assumed, inter alia, by Steedman (2000) . Second, there is the criterion on alternatives:
Contrastive topics are topics-they refer to something about which information is required. But they are also contrastive, that is, they come with alternatives-there are other things about which information is required. (Krifka 1999) This criterion is open to two interpretations: Any sentence topic (topic focus, theme focus), indeed, any topic or focus (topic or comment focus, theme or rheme focus) presupposes a class of alternatives (as assumed by Rooth 1992 or Büring 1999 , or, a sentence topic is contrastive if the context activates alternatives. I only assume the latter, weak interpretation, on which one cannot tell from a sentence whether its topic has alternatives but one needs to consult the context. In fact, I assume a very simple and general association with topic hypothesis:
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Association with topic
The associate of additives is the accented topic (topic focus, theme focus) of the clause in which they occur.
The ultimate reason for calling topics with alternatives contrastive is conversational: Asserting something about such a topic will implicate that the same assertion cannot be made about the alternatives. I will return to this issue in Section 2.3. The assumption that the additive associates with the topic in the sentence makes it possible to define the semantics of, say, the additive particle too in a succinct way. Assume that T is a (partial) function assigning to a sentence φ its accented topic T (φ). The contribution of too to the meaning of φ consists in the presupposition that there is an alternative α s.t. φ holds under the substitution of α for T (φ):
to an introduced referent such that the context entails φ under the substitution of that referent for T (φ) (cf. Section 4). In a case like (1), where too is necessary, this is indeed the case: The context entails 'he could see mountains to the south [ the south / the north ]'. Now in the version without too, the only difference is that there is no need to verify a presupposition; whereas the sentence with the additive reduces to itself, the one without is itself from the outset,-and there is no prima facie reason that the additive should be necessary, the result being the same with or without it.
Association and verification
The presuppositions of additives are not always verified straightforwardly. Although in general, 'anaphoric' presuppositions are more difficult to accommodate than, say, cleft or factive presuppositions (cf. Zeevat 1992 : 406ff., Saebø 1996 , quite often, they require some measure of accommodation: The discourse referents are verified (bound) but some condition is accommodated. In these cases, the additives convey a message, and they are informationally necessary in the sense that without them, the discourse stays coherent but means something slightly different. Consider (4).
(4) a. The 5000 m race was won by Gianni Romme. The 1500 m race was won by a Dutch skater. b. The 5000 m race was won by Gianni Romme. The 1500 m race was won by a Dutch skater too.
If in (4a) the adjective Dutch carries the focus accent carried by the particle in (4b), the discourse is coherent and it implies that Gianni Romme is not a Dutch skater in the same way as (4b) implies that Gianni Romme is a Dutch skater. The reason that too is not obligatory in (4b) is that the presupposition is not quite verified; Gianni Romme is not necessarily a Dutch skater. It is when its presupposition is verified in a local verbal context that an additive is necessary. Note that a straightforward Gricean Quantity argument cannot be used to account for the infelicity of the versions without the additives, as indeed it has been used (e.g. Gazdar 1979) to derive the implicature that the speaker does not herself believe the proposition if she reports someone's propositional attitude with the verb believe. Consider (5): If the speaker believed that the 1500 m race was won by Gianni Romme, she should have used knows instead of believes.
(5) Paul believes that the 1500 m race was won by Gianni Romme.
The reason that this implicature can be derived from the Maxim of Quantity is that the factive presupposition is regularly accommodated; the proposition will often not be in the common ground and presupposing it will often provide new information. By contrast, when an additive is necessary the presupposition is verified directly, so one cannot argue that adding the additive makes the contribution more informative.
Contrastive implicature
The reason for calling topics with alternatives contrastive topics is conversational: If among the active alternatives you select one and make a predication about that, you implicate that this does not hold for the other alternatives-or else you should have included them in the predication. This Quantity implicature corresponds to Krifka's Distinctiveness Constraint (he attributes it to the maxim of manner):
is a contrastive answer to a question Q, then there is no alternative T' of T such that the speaker is willing
( Krifka 1999) Contrastive answers, in turn, are defined in terms of partial answers to questions. These definitions are intended to carry over to implicit questions. My general version is (assuming full knowledge on the part of the speaker):
Contrastive Implicature
For any φ and c such that T (φ) is defined and there are alternatives
Normally, there is no need to cancel this implicature, it is often corroborated by the continuing context and marked by a contrastive particle, adverb, or conjunction:
(6) On any other day there might have been people constantly coming and going, but not on Sunday morning.
Krifka (1999): distinctiveness
However, sometimes the Distinctiveness implicature arising from a contrastive topic is cancelled, and then, an additive is added. According to Krifka (1999) , an additive is added to get around Distinctiveness, that is, the additive is necessitated by the implicature arising from the sentence verifying the presupposition. This analysis can be seen as an elaboration on a suggestion made by Kaplan (1984) , who ascribes to too a 'discourse function' in addition to its conventional implicature, namely, to emphasize the similarity between contrasting constituents (p. 515):
That is, too is obligatory when we need to emphasize what is important about the content of a two-clause text, when what is important is that the same thing is predicated about two contrasting items.
Attractive as it may seem, there are two arguments that can be raised against this analysis. First, it does not seem to predict the strength of the necessity of the additive. When a conversational implicature-and Distinctiveness is one-arising from one sentence is cancelled in the next, some affirmative element is often called for, but it is normally not as necessary as is the necessary additive particle or adverb, and besides, it may be one among a number, including indeed and in fact; it is not clear why (3b) is not even nearly as good as (3a).
(3) a. Peter sings tenor. Paul sings tenor, too. b. # Peter sings tenor. Indeed / in fact, Paul sings tenor.
Second and more seriously, the sentence where the additive occurs far from always violates the Distinctiveness Constraint-far from always does it contradict a Contrastive Implicature arising from the context where the presupposition is verified.
Counterevidence
There are two cases to be distinguished. First, the presupposed alternative is a contrastive topic but the corresponding implicature is not strong enough to be contradicted by the additive sentence; and second, the presupposed alternative is not a contrastive topic in any reasonable sense of the term. Consider (1), repeated below: In the relevant context sentence, the presupposed alternative, to the north, is arguably a contrastive topic; however, the difference from a case like (3) is that here, the relevant sentence is not equivalent to the too sentence modulo the substitution of the alternative for the associate, it is stronger (more informative). Therefore, the too sentence does not contradict the corresponding contrastive implicature.
(1) Swift Deer could see pine-clad mountains on the other side of the Rain Valley. Far away to the east and west the dry prairies stretched out as far as the eye could see. To the north lay the yellow-brown desert, a low belt of green cactus-covered ridges and distant blue mountain ranges with sharp peaks. To the south #(too) he could see mountains.
Asserting the relevant context sentence arguably implicates, in particular, that it is not the case that to the south lay the yellowbrown desert, a low belt of green cactus-covered ridges and distant blue mountain ranges with sharp peaks-but this is compatible with the continuation, the too sentence; all this sentence says is that to the south he could see mountains, not that they were distant blue ranges with sharp peaks. Similar examples, where the relevant context is stronger than it has to be to verify the presupposition, abound. Then the contrastive implicature is too weak for the additive sentence to contradict it. This case often co-occurs with the case that the presupposed alternative is not a contrastive topic in the relevant context sentence. The presupposed alternative is often not an accented topic at all. In (7), for instance, there is no accent on the constituent Swift Deer, which is later on to act as a presupposed alternative: (7) The case that the additive is necessary although the alternative is not a contrastive topic seems to be particularly frequent when the associate and the alternative denote times in narrative discourse, as in (9). Here the presupposed alternative-the time when Loki averts the danger-is implicit, and there is no suggestion that this is the last time he does so.
(9) When the gods arrive at Jotunheim, the giants prepare the wedding feast. But during the feast, the bride-Thor, that isdevours an entire ox and eight salmon. He also drinks three barrels of beer. This astonishes Thrym. But Loki averts the danger by explaining that Freyja has been looking forward to coming to Jotunheim so much that she has not eaten for a week. When Thrym lifts the bridal veil to kiss the bride, he is startled to find himself looking into Thor's burning eyes. This time, too, Loki saves the situation, explaining that the bride has not slept for a week for longing for Jotunheim.
In this light it is not surprising that situations where again is obligatory even though the presupposed alternative is not a contrastive topic are frequent; cf. (2) and (10) . And when the presupposing sentence is adjacent to the context verifying the presupposition, the presupposed alternative will usually be a contrastive topic. However, as (2), (8), (9), and (10) show, too or again can be obligatory even though the verifying context is several sentences away and the presupposed alternative is not a contrastive topic. The following claim by Kaplan (1984: 515 ) is thus wrong:
It makes sense, then, that where the difference between contrasting constituents is most marked is where too is most needed, to counterbalance the heightened effect of the contrast.
Where the difference between contrasted constituents is hardly stressed, too is optional.
WHY ADDITIVES ARE NECESSARY: THE DIAGNOSIS
So the sentence verifying the additive presupposition cannot be held responsible for the incoherence of a discourse like (1) if too is omitted. Rather, we should suspect the sentence without the additive. But what is the sentence without the additive? Once accents are taken into account, this is far from obvious.
(1) Swift Deer could see pine-clad mountains on the other side of the Rain Valley. Far away to the east and west the dry prairies stretched out as far as the eye could see. To the north lay the yellow-brown desert, a low belt of green cactus-covered ridges and distant blue mountain ranges with sharp peaks. To the SOUTH #(TOO) he could see mountains. Krifka (1999) implicitly assumes that in the sentence without too corresponding to the too sentence, some other constituent-in his examples, the object NP-carries the focus accent carried by too in the too sentence. This would correspond to (11a). ( (11) is intended to be neutral with respect to prosody.)
. . . To the south he could see mountains.
(11) a. . . . To the SOUTH he could see MOUNtains. However, this version is arguably incoherent for an independent reason, violating the more basic constraint that second mention material cannot carry an accent (cf. van Deemter 1994) . To see that this part of the incoherence is independent of the context which necessitates the additive, consider the dialogue in (11b): (11) Actually, one has to show that (11) will cause problems under any intonation. A version without a focus or a topic accent is, however, ruled out on more general, phonological grounds. Note, by the way, that when the associate is covert, as in (12), such an accentless version will be the only alternative to a version where second mention material is accented:
(12) Female spiders are said to eat their mates. But in fact this happens only occasionally. One of the most notorious is the female black widow spider and it is probably true that a male black widow spider must approach a female with care. Usually, the male mates sucCESSfully and lives to mate #(AGAIN).
And, as we saw, the version where some other constituent inherits the accent from the additive, like (11a), violates at least the constraint that second mention material cannot carry an accent. The question is thus why (11c), where the additive takes its accent with it so that only its 'former associate' carries an accent, is infelicitous (in the context of (1)). Now this accent can, in principle, be or be interpreted as not a topic accent but a focus accent, as in the answer in (11d).
(11) d. -Where could he see mountains from where he was? -To the SOUTH he could see mountains.
However, it does not matter much whether the accent in (11c) is, or is interpreted as, a focus accent or a topic accent, for, as assumed by Rooth (1992) , who used an indiscriminate notion of focus, a topic and a focus will amount to basically the same as regards contrast, generating essentially the same contrastive (scalar) implicature.
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Intuitively, (11c) (in the context of (1)) is reminiscent of a selfcorrection; as if the author is no longer sure that Swift Deer could see mountains to the north. Note that what would be an obligatory too in monologue can be an optional, though informative, too in dialogue; in (13), the version without too reads as a correction. There is nothing incoherent about this version, but it implies that the second speaker disagrees with the first. The version with too implies that the second speaker agrees with the first but adds a piece of information. If the dialogue is recast as a monologue, we get the effect that the speaker corrects herself. This self-correction effect is especially pronounced when the associate is a demonstrative, as in (9). It is reasonable to assume that it results from a contrast between what is first said and what is subsequently implicated. It can be shown that given Association with Topic (2.1), Semantics of too (2.1), and Contrastive Implicature (2.3), (11c) implicates, in particular, that he couldn't see mountains to the north, which is of course ostensibly contradicted in the context; and that this is necessarily so because (11c) is in a context verifying the presupposition of the version with too.
Association with Topic
Semantics of too too*
Contrastive Implicature For any φ and c such that T (φ) is defined and there are alternatives
So we see that Krifka was half right: The alternative is not consistently a contrastive topic, but the associate is (as he assumed all along); the context does not consistently generate a contrastive implicature contradicted by the too sentence, but it is the other way around: The too sentence generates a contrastive implicature contradicted by the context, and systematically so. The generalization is:
A sentence φ for which too is defined in a context which verifies the presupposition of too(φ) implicates ( Thus if the presupposition is verified whenever too is obligatory, whenever too is obligatory there is a contradiction between what the sentence without it implicates and what the context entails.
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Note that this does not amount to a cancellation. Cancellation is when you first generate an implicature and then go on to contradict it, and it is not supposed to cause a serious problem. Here it is the other way around: first you say something and then you generate an implicature contradicted by what you said. the version with the additive is coherent. In fact, the semantics of the additive as it stands does not, or not necessarily, suffice to answer the question why the additive is sufficient.
To see this, note that the contrastive implicature which causes the incoherence in the version without the additive is computed on the basis of the assertion. True, the presupposition can cause accommodation effects, but when no accommodation is necessary, as in the cases under consideration here, it acts as an admittance condition and is supposed to disappear once it is verified.
One may want to say that contrastive implicatures are not computed solely on the basis of the assertion but on the basis of the assertion and the presupposition, and in the event of a conflict between a presupposition and a potential implicature the former overrules or alters the latter. After all, quantity implicatures have been assumed to be sensitive to presuppositional elements; for instance, the one triggered by the verb believe (cf. 2.2) is of course not triggered by the verb know, although the assertion is supposed to be invariant (Gazdar 1979) .
However, that case seems to be special in two respects. First, since the factive presupposition is so regularly accommodated, it acts more like an assertion than an admittance condition. Second, the implicature triggered by believe can be argued to arise through a competition with know, as opposed to contrastive implicatures, which can hardly be said to arise through a competition with additives.
Still, one may wish to maintain that presuppositions can overrule or influence implicatures. But I do not think one should commit oneself to that assumption. Therefore, I would like to show how the problem can be solved even on the weak assumption that the contrastive implicature is computed solely on the basis of the (topic structured) assertion. This solution consists in having the presupposition affect the implicature indirectly, by way of affecting the assertion.
Reconsider (1) and the hitherto assumed semantics of too.
Let us assume that T (φ) is here '(to) the south'. The alternative α can be anchored to a location such that the context entails that Swift Deer could see mountains there. Once this has been established, the presupposition leaves the scene.
Intuitively, however, it makes the alternative escape the contrastive implicature. In fact, there is a natural way to accomplish this: In the output of the additive, the topic of the assertion can be assumed to grow by the presupposed alternative.
Semantics of too
where
; more precisely, the assertion of too(φ) is equal to φ except that its topic is not T (φ) but α ⊕ T (φ). The topic of the output assertion is the sum of the associate and the alternative. To see how this revision affects the assertion and indirectly the implicature in the particular case, we need a precise notion of the verification of a presupposition (cf., for example, Saebø 1996: 190) (C, S, and P are DRSs):
Presupposition Verification
The update of a context C by an assertion S with a presupposition P is defined if there is a unique function f from the universe of P to the universe of C such that the picture of P under f is a logical consequence of C; then it is the merge of C and the picture of S under f . This move is reminiscent of the way the assertion depends on the presupposition in cases of personal pronouns, definite descriptions, and so-called zero anaphora. Only here, it does not make a difference to the truth conditions of the discourse, since the addition to the assertion is already in the common ground. It only makes a difference for the conversational implicature generated by the assertion, as now, the presupposed alternative is not an alternative in terms of Contrastive Implicature.
is 'to the south and to the north', the only alternatives active in (1) is 'to the east' and 'to the west'; here the context confirms the implicature that he could not see mountains to the east or to the west.
To see why 'to the north' is not an alternative to 'to the south and the north' in the intended sense, recall that Contrastive Implicature ultimately derives from the Maxim of Quantity via a more elaborate formulation (cf. Rooth 1992: 82f.) :
For all alternatives to T (φ) α-which can be of the form
Thus 'To the SOUTH he could see mountains' implicates the negation of the stronger 'To the south and to the north he could see mountains' and thus also in effect the negation of 'To the north he could see mountains'; but of course, 'To the south and to the north he could see mountains' does not implicate the negation of itself. This reasoning shows that in general, α does not count as an alternative to α ⊕ T (φ) in terms of Contrastive Implicature. On the revised analysis, the assertion inherits part of its topic from the context-the topic accumulates, becoming an aggregate contrastive topic. To accomplish this, an anaphoric notion of presupposition verification,à la van der Sandt (1992), is necessary. Thus the proposed analysis argues against Zeevat (2003) , who takes the necessity of discourse particles like too, inter alia, to indicate that they are not presupposition triggers at all but 'context markers'. Until the notion of 'additive marking' is made precise, it cannot predict much, and as preliminary formulations (e.g. p. 103) seem to indicate, once it is made precise it will probably come very close to the notion of additive presupposition proposed above.
CONCLUSIONS
It has long been a mystery what justifies the existence of pure presupposition triggers like additive particles or adverbs, seeing that the presuppositions are usually verified. What is the use of words which only make it more difficult for a sentence to fit into a context, and which only reflect what is already there if the sentence does fit into the context? The present paper provides a partial answer: Pure presupposition triggers can be useful, even necessary, as conventional devices for contracepting unwanted conversational effects-self-correction effects, contrastive implicatures. Krifka (1999) made a proposal in this spirit, but was sidetracked by a too narrow empirical basis; in a constructed setting of two successive partial answers, where the second needs an additive, there is a perfect parallel between the verifying and the presupposing sentence, and both the associate in the latter and the alternative in the former will be a contrastive topic and cause a contrastive implicature contradicted by the other sentence.
Krifka concentrated on the implicature of the verifying sentence, but in general, the relation between the two sentences is asymmetric: The alternative in the verifying sentence is not always a contrastive topic, and when it is, the implicature is not always contradicted by the presupposing sentence. What is consistently the case is that the associate in the presupposing sentence (if it is accented; otherwise a necessary additive is necessary for there to be an accent at all in the sentence) is a contrastive topic and-in the absence of the additive-causes a contrastive implicature contradicted by the verifying sentence, resulting in a self-correction comparable to that in (14b): (14) a. The male pop stars wore caftans. The female pop stars did #(too). b. The pop stars wore caftans. The female pop stars did. Now while the self-correction effect in (14b) can be alleviated, by adding at least, at any rate, or something like that, it cannot really be cured; the additive too, on the other hand, does cure the self-correction effect in (14a) if included. The reason must be sought in its semanticsas it stands, its standardly assumed semantics, or in a slightly modified form. While the possibility cannot be ruled out that the standardly assumed presupposition suffices to nullify or to mollify the implicature, it has also been shown how the big implicature can be appropriately reduced while maintaining that it is computed solely on the basis of the (topic-focus structured) assertion; by letting the presupposed alternative be added to the topic of the clause. Then the contrast will not concern that alternative.
Thus the function of these words is not just to make life harder for the sentences they occur in; they also serve to accumulate topics as parallel information is added in a text and so to steer clear of contrasts that would otherwise be communicated. It is not unreasonable to assume that this provides one reason for their existence.
